Introduction
South Asia' s persistent poverty and limited integration with the world economy are in sharp contrast to the successful export-oriented industrialization of its neighbour, East Asia. This paper seeks to shed light on this contrast, and to contribute to trade and development strategy in South Asia, by examining and explaining the structure (or commodity composition) of the exports of both Asian regions in a world-wide comparative context. The central hypothesis of the paper is that differences among countries in the broad features of their export structure are the result mainly of differences in supplies of human and natural resourcesÐ differences which, moreover, change over time only slowly. Section 2 explains why and how the export structure of a country is in¯uenced by its human and natural resources, both in theory and in practice. Section 3 compares South Asia as a whole with other regions of the world, asking how far the differences in export structure among them can be explained by differences in their resource supplies. Section 4 asks the same question about all the individual South Asian (and East Asian) countries, comparing what they actually export with what would be predicted from their resources. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results for South Asia' s export prospects and policies. 1 Jo È rg Mayer, UNCTAD, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Adrian Wood, DFID, 94 Victoria Street, London SW1E 5JL, UK. Adrian Wood' s work on this paper was ® nanced by the UK Department for International Development (through grant CNTR 95 4010A), and a visit to India to discuss it was ® nanced by the World Bank. However, the views expressed in the paper are those of its authors and do not necessarily re¯ect the views of UNCTAD, DFID or the World Bank. The authors are grateful for valuable comments from Sanjaya Lall, Manoj Pant, Suresh Tendulkar, Arvind Virmani and other participants in seminars at ICRIER and the Indian Statistical Institute.
In¯uence of Resources on Export Structure
That the composition of a country' s exports is in¯uenced by its resources is an old idea, and a simple one. The mixture of goods which people want to consume varies less among countries than the mixture of goods which their resources allow to be cheaply produced. Countries thus tend to export goods whose production makes intensive use of resources of which they have a relatively large supply, and conversely to import goods which require large inputs of resources that are locally scarce. This idea is the basis of Heckscher± Ohlin (H-O) trade theory.
Theory
Some variants of H-O theory are based on implausibly strong assumptions, particularly that all countries are equally ef® cient, and that trade equalizes wages and other factor prices among countries, so that all countries use exactly the same combination of resources to produce one unit of any good. However, the prediction of H-O theory that is relevant to the present paper, namely that the composition of a country' s exports depends on the composition of its resources, requires only a much weaker and more plausible assumption, namely that in all countries the ranking of goods in terms of resource input combinations is similarÐ for example, that the land/labour input ratio in agriculture is always greater than in manufacturing.
H-O theory cannot provide a complete explanation of the pattern of trade: other forces are also important (and will be considered in this paper). Some differences in ef® ciency among countries are uneven among goods, and a country which was particularly ef® cient in producing a good would tend to export that good, even if the mixture of resource inputs required gave it no special advantage. Economies of scale are important in explaining the large volume of trade that occurs among countries with similar resources, and in explaining the ® ne details of the composition of trade. The pattern of trade is also affected by many sorts of government policies, including charges and restrictions on imports, and by transport costs and varying distances among countries.
None the less, H-O theory provides a useful broad-brush explanation of some major features of the pattern of trade. In particular, recent research has found that it explains much of the variation among countries in the shares of manufactures, processed primary products and unprocessed primary products in their exports (Wood & Berge, 1997; Owens & Wood, 1997; Mayer, 1997) . H-O theory also explains North± South trade in manufactures, and in particular why developing countries export labour-intensive items to developed countries in exchange for imports of skill-intensive items (many studies are reviewed in Wood, 1994, Chapter 3) . The resources whose varying supply among countries causes this variation in export composition are three broad ones: skill (or ª human capitalº , acquired through education and training); land (meaning natural resources of all sorts); and labour (the number of people in the workforce).
By contrast with most other H-O models, capital (physical or ® nancial) is omitted from this list of resources. The reason is that capital, though of vital importance as an input to production, is now highly mobile among countries, so that it cannot plausibly be regarded as a resource of which a large ® xed ª endowmentº gives some countries a comparative advantage in the production and export of capital-intensive goods. If a country has a comparative advantage in a good because of the abundance of a resource such as copper ore or educated labour, then it can usually obtain the capital needed to develop this resource, either from domestic savings or from abroad. Moreover, because domestic capital markets are linked to international capital markets, the cost of capital is similar in most countries, so differences in capital intensity among sectors do not cause differences in comparative advantage among countries (Wood, 1994, pp. 32± 40) . There are exceptions to these generalizations, particularly in developing countries, but they appear to be a good ® rst approximation to the truth.
Both labour and skill are also internationally mobile to some extent. Only a small fraction of the world' s labour force is able to move among countries, but for some individual countries such mobility is important (and the remittances of their mobile workers are an important ª exportº ). There is also a high degree of mobility among some of the world' s most skilled workers: those with the experience, know-how and contacts needed to produce and sell goods on world markets, which is what exporting is all about. As with capital, the international mobility of highly-skilled workers means that their services can usually be obtained to develop the production of goods in which a country' s resources give it a comparative advantage, reinforcing the H-O pattern of trade. However, barriers to harnessing the skills of such workersÐ poor communications facilities or restrictions on direct foreign investment, for exampleÐ may impede the realization of a resource-based comparative advantage in particular countries and particular sectors.
Econometric Speci® cation
The simplest of our models explains variation among countries in the share of manufactures in their exports as a consequence of variation in their relative supplies of only two of the three resources: skill and land. Manufacturing is more compact than agriculture, and needs a more educated labour force: as a consequence, it requires a much higher ratio of skill to land. Given this basic difference in the resource mixtures needed to produce manufactures and primary products, a country' s comparative advantage as between these two sorts of goods depends heavily on its relative supplies of skill and land. Countries with high ratios of skill to land tend to export manufactures, while those with low ratios of skill to land tend to export primary products. This relationship is measured using a cross-country regression:
where X nm and X bp are (gross) exports of manufactures and primary products, h/n is the ratio of skill to land supplies, u is the error term and the subscript i identi® es the country. The skill/land ratio is expressed as skill per worker, h, over land per worker, n (with the per-worker denominators cancelling out). Both the export ratio and the resource ratio are converted into logarithms. This simple skill-and-land-only model is a good approximation, but its omission of labour implicitly assumes that manufacturing and primary production are equally labour-intensive. To relax this assumption, and to bring all three resources into the model, the form of the regression needs to be slightly expanded, to: (2) in which the two resource ratios h (skill/labour) and n (land/labour) are entered separately. This speci® cation can be used also to explain variation among countries in the composition of manufactured exports. However, since all manufacturing requires only small inputs of land, the ratio of skill-intensive to labour-intensive manufactured exports is not affected much by cross-country variation in n, and depends mainly on variation in h: the share of skill-intensive items in manufactured exports tends to be greater in countries with more skill per worker. A simple model for this export ratio, again involving only two of the three resources (skill and labour), is thus:
where X nmh /X nml is the ratio of skill-intensive to labour-intensive manufactured exports.
In all these models, to capture possible effects of economies of scale, we shall also include a country size variable. These models refer to (gross) exports, but similar models can be applied to net exports (exports minus imports), as in Owens & Wood (1997) , a speci® cation which would be more appropriate if the aim were to test H-O theory (which focuses on net exports), rather than to analyse the export structure of a particular region. Both gross and net export speci® cations are at risk of ª contaminationº by non-H-O in¯uences: that is, the estimated coef® cients on the resource variables may re¯ect not only pure resource-supply effects, but also other in¯uences on trade whose variation among countries happens to be correlated with variation in resource supplies (for example, the composition of demand may vary with per capita income, which is correlated with skill per worker). Such contamination is more likely with gross than with net exports, because gross exports include all intra-industry trade, much of which is non-H-O in nature. However, the signs of the coef® cients on the resource variables (which are usually the same for net exports as for gross exports) suggest that the dominant in¯uence on them is the resource-supply effects described by H-O theory.
Resource Measures
Skill per worker is measured by the average number of years of schooling of the adult (over-15) population, using data mainly from Barro & Lee (1996) . The stock of skill in a country is thus its total number of person-years of schooling, obtained by multiplying average years of schooling by the number of adult inhabitantsÐ the latter being our measure of the country' s supply of labour (which we also use as our country size variable). We measure the supply of landÐ that is, the availabilit y of natural resources in each countryÐ by a country' s total land area (with land per worker being total land area divided by adult population). Details of our data sources are provided in the appendix of .
Total land area is clearly not an ideal measure of natural-resource availability , since it fails to allow for variation among countries in the quality of their land. But it is an unbiased measure, because what each country has, per square kilometre of its surface area, in terms of soil fertility, water resources, minerals, and so on, can be regarded as the outcome of a random draw. Nor is it easy to improve on this measure. In earlier work (e.g. Wood & Mayer, 1998) , we added information on speci® c natural resources, such as arable land and oil reserves. This was helpful in explaining the composition of primary exports (for example, the division between agricultural and mineral products), but was not helpful as a measure of the quality of natural resources and thus in explaining the division of exports between manufactures and primary products.
Average years of schooling is likewise not an ideal measure of skill. It takes no account of cross-country differences in the quality of schoolingÐ how much (and what) the student learned in the years concerned. Moreover, it neglects sources of skill acquisition other than schoolingÐ both formal classroom training and experience (or on-the-job training). These de® ciencies cannot be remedied with currently available data. 2 For our statistical purposes they are less serious than they might appear, because there is a strong cross-country correlation between years of schooling and these other aspects of skill: countries with longer schooling tend also to provide better quality schooling (Lee & Barro, 1997) and more training. In interpreting the statistical results, however, it is important to bear in mind that it is not just length of schooling which matters. All our resource availabilit y measures are of relative quantities rather than relative prices, even though it is fundamentally the relative cheapness of abundant factors that gives a country a comparative advantage in goods that use them intensively. One reason for using quantity data is that H-O theory predicts that trade reduces (or even eliminates) inter-country differences in factor prices by raising the demand for abundant resources and reducing the demand for scarce ones, making prices in principle a less reliable indicator of the relative abundance of resources. Another, more practical reason is that relevant and comparable data on the prices of skill, land and labour do not exist for most countries.
Export Categories
We divide all (merchandise) exports into two broad categoriesÐ manufactured and primary. Our de® nition of manufactures is the one used by trade statisticians, namely categories 5± 8 less 68 (non-ferrous metals) of the Standard International Trade Classi® cation (SITC). 3 This de® nition is narrower than that used by production and employment statisticians, who also count as manufactures natural-resource-based products made in factories, such as canned food, and so we label our category NM (for ª narrow manufacturesº ). Table 1 lists the goods which are included in NM. All other goods are classi® ed by trade statisticians as primary products, and so we label our primary category BP (where B stands for ª broadº ). We sub-divide manufactured exports between skill-intensive items (NMH) and labour-intensive items (NML), using the classi® cation in Wood & Mayer (1998) , which was based on a review of earlier studies that ranked individual manufacturing industries by their skilled/unskilled labour ratios or other measures of skill intensity (particularly the studies reviewed in Wood, 1994, Chapter 3, and OECD, 1992) . Our allocation of SITC categories between NMH and NML is shown in Table 1 , and in most respects is familiar and uncontroversial, although the division into only two groups is arbitrary: textiles, clothing, footwear, leather and wood products are classi® ed as labourintensive, and chemicals, machinery, cars, aircraft and instruments as skill-intensive.
A limitation of any classi® cation of manufactured exports by skill intensity is the internal heterogeneity of statistically de® ned industries. Each industry contains many goods (® nal and intermediate) and many activities (or stages of production) of widely varying skill intensity, which are increasingly divided among countries (e.g. Feenstra, 1998) . For example, in the electrical machinery sector skill-intensive components are made in developed countries and labour-intensive assembly is undertaken in developing countries. Thus, the same`good' , in a statistical sense, may vary widely in skill intensity, depending on the country from which it is exported. There is no simple solution to this problem with existing export data, but it is vital to be aware of it in interpreting the results of statistical analysis.
We experimented also with the limited data available on exports of services. Different kinds of services vary in skill intensity no less widely than different kinds of manufactured goods, and there are differences also in land intensity (for example, between tourism and ® nancial services). However, the only statistics that exist for large numbers of countries divide total service exports into just three categoriesÐ transport, travel and otherÐ which bear no obvious resemblance to a classi® cation by either skill intensity or land intensity. Moreover, these data on trade in services are in most cases probably less accurate than the data on merchandise trade. Table 2 reports the results of cross-country regressions describing the relationships between export structure and resources. They refer to 1990, and cover 111 countriesÐ all those with populations over one million for which data are available. The ® rst four regressions in the table focus on two aspects of export structureÐ the ratios NM/BP and NMH/NML de® ned earlierÐ in each case using both a ª fullº speci® cation and a simpli® ed speci® cation. 4 The ® rst regression shows that variation across countries in their manufactured/ primary export ratios is quite well explained simply by variation in their skill/land ratios, but the second regression improves the explanation by separating the skill/land ratio into two separate resource ratios (skill/labour and land/labour) and including a country size variable. The ratio of manufactured to primary exports tends to be higher in countries which have more skill per worker and less land per worker, and which are bigger. This last effect is perhaps the result of external economies in manufacturing: ® rms bene® t from the presence of other ® rms, for example because a larger manufacturing sector makes it economic to develop more specialized support services, training and infrastructure (Keesing & Sherk, 1971) .
Regression Results
The second pair of regressions explains cross-country variation in the division of manufactured exports between skill-intensive and labour-intensive items. These regressions are estimated using a smaller set of 69 countries, namely those in which manufactures account for 10% or more of total exports: in countries which export few manufactures, the NMH/NML ratio varies widely and erratically, due to the vagaries of statistical classi® cation. The largest and most signi® cant coef® cient in the full speci® cation is that on h: countries with higher levels of skill per worker tend to export higher ratios of skill-intensive to labour-intensive manufactures. The coef® cients on the other two variables, n and p, are small and statistically insigni® cant, so that the simpli® ed speci® cation ® ts just as well as the full speci® cation. The ® nal three rows of Table 2 report results for exports of all services (separate regressions for transport, travel and other services yield similar results).
5 The ® rst regression shows that the ratio of service exports to broad primary exports is greater in countries with higher h, smaller in those with higher n, and unrelated to country size. The other regressions refer to the ratios of service exports to skill-intensive and labour-intensive manufactured exports: both ratios decrease with country size, re¯ecting the positive effect of country size on manufactured exports noted above, and both are (insigni® cantly) greater in countries with higher n. However, the SVS/NMH export ratio is lower in countries with higher h, whereas the SVS/NML export ratio is unrelated to h. Together, these results suggest that traded services are on average much less land-intensive than primary products (though slightly more land-intensive than manufactures), and of about the same skill intensity as labour-intensive manufactures. Some service exports are of course far more skill-intensive, but the average is dominated by items of relatively low skill intensity.
All these regressions leave half or more of the cross-country variation in export structure unexplained. Measurement errors in our trade and resource data account for part of this shortfall, but part of it must be due to variation in systematic in¯uences, including trade and other policies. Extensive experiments with trade policy measures as additional independent variables in these and similar regressions achieved little improvement in their explanatory power (Wood & Berge, 1997, pp. 49± 53; Wood & Mayer, 1998, annex 4) . Nor have we been able to ® nd any other variables whose inclusion substantially improves their explanatory powerÐ tests of infrastructure variables are reported in Zappia (1995) and of foreign direct investment in Greenhill (1999) . However, these failures are probably partly a result of the weaknesses of the few measures of relevant variables that are available for large numbers of countries: the export structures of individual countries and regions are bound to be affected by policies and other variables that are not included in our regressions, and this will be recognized in the application of our results below.
South Asia Compared with Other Regions
The previous section discussed world-wide relationships between countries' export structures and their resources. The rest of the paper will use these relationships to analyse the export structure of South Asia. In Section 4, we shall study South Asian countries individually, and compare them with East Asian countries, but in this section we shall look brie¯y at South Asia as a whole, and compare it with other regions.
We shall distinguish seven other groups of countries. One contains developed countries, and four are regional groupings of developing countries: East Asia, Africa (sub-Saharan), Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The other two groups are subsets of what the World Bank (1993) labelled the ª highperformingº East Asian countries: we shall refer to Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as the ª ® rst-tier East Asian NICsº (newly industrialized countries), and to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand as the ª second-tier East Asian NICsº . Our averages for each group are unweighted: in South Asia, for example, Nepal has as much in¯uence as India. An alternative would be to weight the averages by country size, but in South Asia this would make them into minor variants on the values for India, which contains three-quarters of the region' s population. Figure 1 shows the average (merchandise) export structure of each group in 1990, in terms of our three product categories. South Asia' s manufactured export share is exceeded only by those of the ® rst-tier East Asian NICs and the developed countries; it is somewhat above East Asia as a whole, and far above the other three developing regions (MENA, Latin America and Africa). Labour-intensive items are a larger proportion (and skill-intensive items a smaller proportion) of manufactured exports in South Asia than in any other group, by a considerable margin. Figure 2 shows the average resources of the country groups at 5-year intervals during 1960± 90. South Asia is in the bottom left-hand corner, with a unique combination of low skill per worker and low land per worker. Only Africa has fewer years of schooling than South Asia, and both regions lie well below all the other groups. Only the ® rst-tier East Asian NICs have less land per worker than South Asia: the rest of East Asia has somewhat more, and all the other groups have far more. Over the 30 years covered by the ® gure, each of the groups moved upwards, re¯ecting an increase in average years of schooling; and each of them also moved to the left, as a result of population growth. 6 But there was little change in their positions relative to one another, and there is little reason to anticipate larger changes over the next 30 years.
The in¯uence of these differences in regional resource combinations on regional export structure is shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) . Each ® gure contains the relationship between export structure and resource combinations estimated across all the individual countries in the world (a cross-country regression line, based on the simpli® ed speci® cation in Table 2 ) and the actual average export structures and resource combinations of each of the country groups. Figure 3 (a) shows that countries' manufactured/primary export ratios tend to increase with their skill/land ratios. The country-group averages follow roughly the pattern suggested by the regression line: the ® rst-tier East Asian NICs are up at the right-hand end of the line with high values of both the manufactured/primary export ratio and the skill/land ratio; while Africa, with low values for both ratios, is down at the left-hand end of the line. South Asia is roughly in the middle, with intermediate values of both the manufactured/primary export ratio and the skill/land ratio. South Asia lies well above the regression line, implying that it exports a higher proportion of manufactures than would be predicted from its skill/land ratio, but we shall show later that this is due entirely to the in¯uence of two atypical countriesÐ Afghanistan and Nepal.
Figure 3(b) shows that the ratio of skill-intensive to labour-intensive manufactured exports tends to rise across countries with the level of skill per worker. This ® gure (like the NMH/NML regressions in Table 2 ) refers to a smaller set of countries than the previous ® gure, including only those where manufactures account for 10% or more of total exports. Thus, the membership of some of the country groups is different, but South Asia is unaffected. Once again, the country-group averages follow roughly the pattern suggested by the regression line. The developed countries and the ® rst-tier East Asian NICs have both the highest shares of skill-intensive items and the highest levels of skill per worker. South Asia is at the other end of the spectrum, with both the lowest share of skill-intensive manufactures and the lowest level of skill per worker. However, South Asia lies well below the regression line, implying that it exports an even smaller share of skill-intensive items than would be predicted from its low level of education. Table 3 reports the group averages for service exportsÐ in total, and divided into transport, travel and other servicesÐ as a share of all exports. By contrast with merchandise exports, there is little variation among the groups. The averages for South Asia are distorted by high values for travel and other services in Nepal, excluding which reduces South Asia' s total service export share from the highest of all the groups to 20%, the second lowest (ahead of East Asia). South Asia' s transport services share is similar to that of most other groups (though again above East Asia). Its travel services share, which also looks similar to that of most other groups, drops to 4%, lower than any other group, if Nepal is excluded. Excluding Nepal also lowers South Asia' s other services share, but it remains (at 10%) higher than any other group. All these differences between South Asia and the other groups, however, are small and statistically insigni® cant. Their economic signi® cance is also hard to assess without a ® ner breakdown of service exports.
To summarize, the analysis of group averages in this section has shown that South Asia has an unusual merchandise export pattern, concentrated on labour-intensive manufactures, with few primary exports and few skill-intensive manufactured exports, and that this pattern is quite well explained by South Asia' s unusual combination of low levels of both skill per worker and land per worker. By comparison with the rest of the world, South Asia has a lot of labour, relative to its supplies of both skill and land, and so its exports are concentrated on a type of good which uses large inputs of labour and small inputs of both skill and land. A f g h a n is ta n S r i L a n k a I n d ia P a k is t a n B a n g la d e s h N e p a l H o n g K o n g K o r e a T a iw a n C h in a S in g a p o r e P h il ip p in e s T h a il a n d M a la y s ia I n d o n e s ia P a p u a N e w G u in e a M y a n m a r
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Individual South Asian Countries
The previous section examined the situation of South Asia as a whole, relative to other groups of countries. This section looks at all the individual South Asian countries, asking essentially the same questions as in the previous section: about the composition of their exports, about their combinations of human and natural resources and about the connections between their export structures and their resources. This last question will be addressed by comparing each country' s actual export structure with the structure predicted from its resources on the basis of the cross-country relationships discussed and estimated in Section 2. It will be addressed also by including in the analysis, for purposes of comparison, the individual countries of East Asia. 
Variation in Export Structure and Resources
The 1990 merchandise export structures of individual South Asian and East Asian countries are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 and in Figure 4 , where countries are arranged in descending order of the share of manufactures in their exports. (More recent export data are given in the Appendix, Table A1 .) In South Asia, the share of manufactures is over 70% in four of the six countries, but is only one-half in Sri Lanka and one-third in Afghanistan. In East Asia, the share of manufactures varies even more widely.
The share of skill-intensive items in manufactured exports is low in ® ve of the six countries of South Asia (as is re¯ected in the low regional average). However, in India, 
102.2
Sources: Export data from UNCTAD database, education and population data from Barro & Lee (1996) , land area data from World Bank.
a SITC 75± 77 includes computers and of® ce equipment, communications equipment and electrical machinery. Table 4 for the list of country abbreviations.
which is by far the largest of the six, this share is much higherÐ about two-® fths. In all the East Asian countries except Indonesia, the share of skill-intensive items is well above the South Asian average. (The shares of skill-intensive items in Myanmar and Papua New Guinea (PNG) have little meaning, because these countries export so few manufactures, and will not be considered further in our analysis.)
These skill-intensive shares must be interpreted with caution, because of the problems of classifying manufacturing sectors mentioned earlier. Half of India' s high share (compared with the rest of South Asia) consists of cut diamonds, whose classi® cation as skill-intensive is questionable.
8 There are problems of classi® cation also for electrical and electronic goods (SITC 75± 77), which, as shown in Table 4 , are a large proportion of the skill-intensive exports of most East Asian countriesÐ China and Indonesia being important exceptions. In some countries, these exports are largely the product of labour-intensive assembly activities, so that our data may overstate the differences in skill-intensive shares between South Asia and East Asia and, within East Asia, between, say, China and Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia and Thailand on the other hand (we shall return to this issue later).
The service exports of individual Asian countries are analysed in Mayer & Wood (1999, table A1) . In four of the South Asian countries, services are about 20% of all exports, but in Afghanistan the share is much lower and in Nepal much higher. There is also wide variation among South Asian countries in the composition of their service exports. In East Asia, the service export share is below the South Asian average in six of the nine countries for which data are available .
The resources of individual South Asian and East Asian countries are shown in columns 4± 6 of Table 4 and in Figure 5 . There is a large overlap in natural resource availabilit y between the two regions, but far less overlap of skill availability : average years of schooling in every South Asian country except Sri Lanka are less than in every East Asian country except Myanmar and PNG. A ® ner breakdown , table A2) reveals that the differences in average years of schooling between South Asia and East Asia arise mainly from differences in literacy rates: in all South Asian countries except Sri Lanka, a larger fraction of the adult population has no schooling than in any East Asian country except PNG. By contrast, there is little systematic difference between South and East Asia in the proportion of literate people who have some college education, which averages about 10% in both regions (although it varies widely among countries).
In the combined scatter of skill and land availabilit y in Figure 5 , which includes all the Asian countries except the two most land-abundant ones (Afghanistan and PNG), the countries of South Asia all lie closer to the origin than the countries of East Asia (apart from Singapore). This is the same pattern as the regional averages in Figure 2 : relative to their supplies of labour, South Asian countries have less skill or less land (or both, most conspicuously in Bangladesh) than East Asian countries.
Actual and Predicted Export Structures
In Section 3, we showed that South Asia' s average export structure is explained well by its average combination of human and natural resources. Is the same true of South (and East) Asian countries individually? To answer this question, we use the regressions estimated in Section 2 to predict the export structure of each Asian country, and compare this prediction with its actual export structure.
Our predictions are based on regressions that exclude all the Asian countries (roughly one-sixth of all the countries in our data set). We also exclude eight African countries which we found in Wood & Mayer (1998) to have manufactured export shares far below what is predicted from their resources, because of poor infrastructure and macroeconomic policies. The sizes of the regression coef® cients vary quite substantially, depending on whether or not these African countries are included. Moreover, the predictions for South Asia are especially sensitive to their inclusion, because they have resources similar to South AsiaÐ low skill per worker and (unusually for Africa) low land per worker. Thus, if these African countries are included in the regression, predicted manufactured export shares in South Asia are lower, and actual shares appear higher relative to the predictionsÐ misleadingly so, in our judgement.
Using the full speci® cation of the regression for the share of skill-intensive items in manufactured exports with the Asian countries omitted from the data causes the coef® cient on land per worker to become signi® cantly negative and that on country size signi® cantly positive, both being near zero with the Asian countries included ( Table 2 , regression 4). This increases the predicted skill-intensive shares of manufactured exports in both Asian regions, where most countries have low land per worker, and particularly in South Asia, where the typical country is also big. It thus makes actual shares seem lower, relative to the predictions. However, each of these coef® cients is driven by a few countries. The coef® cient on country size reverts to insigni® cance if we drop six large developed countries, as does that on land per worker if we drop 11 countries with high values of n, at the other end of the spectrum to the Asian countries. We therefore used the simpli® ed speci® cation (with skill per worker as the only independent variable) as our preferred predicting regression. Figure 6 and Table 5 show, for each of the countries of South and East Asia, the predictions made with our preferred regressions for the share of manufactures in exports and compare these predictions with the actual shares. a Myanmar and Papua New Guinea are omitted from the last three columns because the shares of manufactures in their total exports are too small for the division between skill-intensive and labour-intensive goods to be meaningful. b Discrepancies between ª actual minus predictedº and ª actualº minus ª predictedº are due to rounding. Figure 6 and the ® rst three columns of Table  5 show that for most of the Asian countries the actual share of manufactures is quite close to the predicted share, meaning that differences in export structure among them are fairly well explained by differences in their resources and size. The discrepancies for six of the 17 countries, including Bangladesh, are ® ve percentage points or less, and are less than 15 percentage points for ® ve more countries, including the two other large South Asian ones. India exports a somewhat smaller share of manufactures than predicted, and in this regard is similar to China (with almost identical actual and predicted sharesÐ the latter is the result of China' s higher h and larger size than India being almost exactly offset by its higher n). Pakistan, however, exports a somewhat larger share of manufactures than predicted, with its actual share being somewhat above that of India, and its predicted share being considerably lower because of its larger n and smaller size. Only three of the discrepancies in East Asia exceed 15 percentage points and all of these are negative. Although many of the discrepancies between actual and predicted shares are probably due simply to de® ciencies of our trade or resource data, there are plausible explanations for the larger ones. The unusually high manufactured export shares of Afghanistan and Nepal are probably a result of the low quality of their natural resourcesÐ agriculture limited by mountainous terrain or lack of water, and few valuable minerals. The unusually low share in Sri Lanka has risen since the date to which our export data refer, and by 1994 (Table A1 ) was close to our predicted share. Sri Lanka' s adoption of outward-oriented industrial trade policies in the late 1970s allowed it to realize its comparative advantage in manufacturing, but its export structure adjusted slowly, perhaps because of the country' s long history as a primary exporter and consequent accumulation of primary-sector-speci® c skills and capital.
Share of manufactures in total exports.
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The lower-than-predicted share in Indonesia, which rose substantially in the 1990s (Table A1) , partly re¯ects its late (1986) adoption of outward-oriented policies, but also re¯ects its large oil exportsÐ our land area measure underestimates Indonesia' s natural resources. The negative discrepancy in Singapore is also due to oil (but in this case to re® ning of imported crude), while the low share in Myanmar is a result of the country' s autarkic policies.
The regional average of the discrepancies in Table 5 suggests that South Asia has a higher-than-predicted share of manufactures in its exports, as is implied also by the South Asia point in Figure 3 (a) being well above the regression line. But this is due entirely to Afghanistan and Nepal: if these countries are omitted from the averages, South Asia' s actual manufactured export share is close to its predicted share. (Their omission has little effect on the actual average, but it raises the predicted average substantially, because the skill/land ratios of both countries are low.) Even if, in addition, the actual share for Sri Lanka is raised to its 1994 level, the regional average discrepancy is small. The regional average of the East Asian discrepancies in Table 5 suggests that the actual manufactured export share is somewhat lower than the predicted share, but this is due entirely to Indonesia, Singapore and Myanmar, whose omission would bring the actual average close to the predicted average. Table 5 show, for each Asian country, the actual and predicted shares of skill-intensive items in its manufactured exports. The most striking feature of the results is the general dissimilarity between the two regions: in most South Asian countries, both the actual share and the predicted share are smaller than in most East Asian countries, and the average difference is large and statistically highly signi® cant for both the actual share (31 percentage points) and the predicted share (23 points).
Share of skill-intensive items in manufactured exports. The last three columns of
10 Thus, as the analysis in Section 3 showed, not only are East Asia' s manufactured exports more heavily concentrated than those of South Asia on skill-intensive items, but also most of the difference can be explained by the regional difference in education levels.
It is unlikely that this basic conclusion is vulnerable to errors in the division of actual exports between skill-intensive and labour-intensive items due to the classi® cation problems mentioned earlier, even though the risk of misclassi® cation is particularly high for electrical and electronic exports, which are large in East Asia and all of which are categorized as skill-intensive, including the products of labour-intensive assembly activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the levels of education required of workers in electrical and electronic assembly are usually higher than in the production of textiles, clothing, footwear, leather goods and so on. This impression is reinforced by Table 6 , which refers to Malaysia and the Philippines, countries where electrical assembly exports are important, but which also have large exports of textiles and clothing, so that the skill intensity of the two sectors can be compared. In both countries, the educational quali® cations of the workforce are clearly higher in machinery production than in textiles and clothing. (The machinery sector also covers metallurgy and non-electrical machinery, but most of its workforce in these countries is producing electrical and electronic goods for export, particularly in Malaysia, where it accounted for no less than 11% of economy-wide employment in 1989.)
The manufactured exports of East Asia are thus almost certainly on average more skill-intensive than those of South Asia, as our numbers imply, despite the classi® cation problem. However, there is probably substantial variation among countries in the true skill intensity of the goods in both the skill-intensive and the labour-intensive export categories. This may well be why our models explain less of the variation in this aspect of export structure (both world-wide and within Asia) than in the share of manufactures in total exports. It also calls for caution in interpreting the sizes of the discrepancies between actual and predicted shares in Asia, both for individual countries and the regional averages. The discrepancies in the last column of Table 5 vary widely in size and sign. Only in two of the 15 countries are they under ® ve percentage points, although in ® ve more countries, three of which are in South Asia, they are under 15 percentage points. The average discrepancy between the actual and predicted shares is close to zero in East Asia, but 2 9 percentage points in South Asia (or 2 12 points if India' s cut-diamond exports are reclassi® ed), which is consistent with the impression obtained earlier from Figure 3 (b) that skill-intensive manufactured export shares in South Asia are even lower than predicted from its low level of education. However, this difference is statistically insigni® cant, 11 because of the wide variation of discrepancies within each region, and it would vanish if either Pakistan and Sri Lanka or Malaysia and Singapore were omitted from the calculation. Nor is there any difference in the pattern of signs of the discrepancies, two-thirds of which are negative in both regions (reclassi® cation of India' s diamond exports would make the proportion only slightly higher in South Asia). These numbers thus provide little evidence of a general difference between South and East Asia in the size or direction of the discrepancies, although such a difference may have emerged during the 1990s.
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Part of the variation in discrepancies among countries in Table 5 , however, must have real economic causes, rather than arising from errors of classi® cation. We considered three possible reasons why a country might fail to achieve its potential in skill-intensive exports. (i) Restrictive trade policies or de® cient infrastructure, which increase the costs of (or delay) imports and exports, and which may have a more adverse effect on skill-intensive than on labour-intensive exports because they depend more heavily on imported intermediate inputs in international production chains. 13 (ii) Obstacles or lack of inducements to direct foreign investment, which may have a more adverse effect on skill-intensive than on labour-intensive exports because their production more often requires proprietary technology or information. (iii) High levels of perceived risk (of disruption of output or markets, or of changes in taxes or regulations), which may have a more adverse effect on skill-intensive than on labour-intensive exports, because skill-intensive production requires more and longer investment in training by ® rms to develop the potential of an educated workforce. 14 None of these causes appears to provide a single, simple explanation for the pattern of discrepancies between actual and predicted skill-intensive export shares in Table 5 . Extension of our world-wide regressions to include proxies for these three in¯uences did not yield clear results.
15 Within Asia, too, there are anomalies: for example, Taiwan, which appears to do well on all three counts, has a negative discrepancy, and Korea an even larger one. However, these causes probably help to explain some of the discrepancies. Good infrastructure and low risk attracted multinational electronics ® rms to Singapore and Malaysia, which have the largest positive discrepancies, while the two largest negative discrepancies, in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are in countries with almost the worst risk ratings in Asia in the late 1980s. 16 The case of Sri Lanka is of particular importance to the analysis of this paper. It is the only country in South Asia with education levels matching those of East Asia, and yet the structure of its exports is similar to other South Asian countries. The smallness of its skill-intensive shareÐ which, unlike the share of manufactures in its total exports, had not risen by 1994 (Table A1 )Ð could thus be seen as contradicting the principal conclusion of this section, which is that South Asia' s manufactured exports are more concentrated on labour-intensive items than those of East Asia mainly because of its lower level of education. To defend this conclusion, it is necessary to provide some supplementary explanation of the large negative discrepancy in Sri Lanka. The single most plausible one is perceptions of risk arising from the country' s prolonged civil strife, which may well have discouraged investorsÐ particularly multinational electronics ® rmsÐ from committing themselves on a large scale to developing skill-intensive export capacity.
Another apparent exception to the principal conclusion of this section, in the opposite direction, is India' s rapidly growing exports of software and related services, which are much more skill-intensive than most of its other exports (Taylor, 1999) . One reason for these exports is often suggested to be that India, despite its low literacy rate, has an unusually large supply of university graduates. However, this is not the case, at least in relative terms: the proportion of literate adults with tertiary education in India in 1990 was similar to the averages for both South and East Asia (Mayer & Wood, 1999, table A2; Lall, 1999 . It is more likely that the software sector in India has speci® c advantages over other sectors which more than offset the disadvantage of low levels of education, particularly widespread command of English, convenient location in terms of time zone, low cost of transport (by telecommunication) and minimal regulation.
Prospects and Policies
What emerges from the analysis of the previous two sections is that the composition of South Asia' s exports can be explained largely and simply by the composition of its resources. In comparison to other regions of the world, and relative to its supply of labour, South Asia has small supplies of skill (low levels of education) and of land (few natural resources). It thus tends to have a comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactures, which use little of either skill or land per unit of labour, and it is indeed on this category of goods that South Asia' s exports are concentrated. By contrast, the exports of East Asia, which has just as little land as South Asia but a higher level of education, also consist mainly of manufactures, but a larger share of them are skillintensive.
Looking to the future, the implication of our analysis is that the composition of South Asia' s exports is unlikely to change substantially unless or until its general level of education rises, relative to that of the rest of the world. Although the absolute level of education in South Asia will surely continue to rise in the future, the region' s comparative advantage will shift from labour-intensive to skill-intensive manufactures only if its increase in education is faster than in the rest of the worldÐ and, correspondingly, faster than in the past. This basic fact must be at the centre of any assessment of South Asia' s long-term export prospects.
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Although most of our analysis has been limited to merchandise exports, the same basic fact is relevant to South Asia' s prospects for exports of services: its comparative advantage tends to lie in labour-intensive activities. An important difference, however, is that labour-intensive and skill-intensive manufactures are more or less equally tradable (involving similar transport costs and facing similar policy barriers), whereas labour-intensive services are less tradable than skill-intensive services. More precisely, the export of most labour-intensive services would require long-term physical presence in the importing country, which is severely restricted by immigration laws, while many skill-intensive services can now be exported through telecommunication and/or brief visits. As a result, South Asia' s exports of services may be more skill-intensive on average than its exports of goods.
18
This paper has focused on only one aspect of South Asia' s exportsÐ their commodity compositionÐ and has neglected another important aspect, namely the overall size of these exports, relative to South Asia' s total production (its openness) and to the exports of other regions. There is a striking con¯ict of evidence on the issue of South Asia' s openness. Most studies of barriers to tradeÐ transport costs as well as tariffs and quotasÐ have concluded that South Asia is an unusually closed region (e.g. Radelet et al., 1997; Pigato et al., 1997) . This impression is shared by foreign businessmen: for example, buyers of footwear are deterred from sourcing in India by poor infrastructure and cumbersome customs clearance, which make it harder and slower to import components and to export the ® nal product than in other countries (Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000) . In contrast, most econometric studies have found that trade/GDP ratios in South Asia are more or less what would be expected, given the large size, low income and location of the countries concernedÐ although these studies also ® nd that trade/GDP ratios in East Asia are unusually high (Radelet et al., 1997, tables 5a and 5b; Pigato et al., 1997, annex I.II; Wood, 1996, But whether or not South Asia' s exports are abnormally low relative to its GDP, they are certainly low relative to the exports of other countries. In 1996, the total merchandise exports of this region of 1.3 billion people were about US $50 billion, which was less than the exports of Thailand, a country of 60 million people, one-third of the exports of China, with a similar-sized population, and 1% of the world' s exports, as compared with South Asia' s 22% of its population (World Bank, 1998/99, indicators tables 1 and 20). In the global context, the smallness of South Asia' s exports is a re¯ection overwhelmingly not of the smallness of its export/GDP ratio but of the smallness of its GDP (total and per capita). The key objective for the future must thus be to raise greatly the absolute levels of both exports and GDP.
For the next two or three decades at least, our analysis suggests that such an expansion of exports would and should be concentrated on labour-intensive manufactures. The world market for such goods is not attractive: competition is ® erce, prices are low, and hence so are wages. But for most people in South Asia, these low wages would be well above what they now earn in subsistence agriculture, and for the region as a whole, there seems to be no other way of achieving, over the medium term, a really large increase in exports (although some more skill-intensive sectors, including software, could also make a useful contribution to export growth: Lall, 1999) . Moreover, growth of South Asia' s labour-intensive manufactured exports will be assisted by the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, which could allow the region to capture a large share of global garment exports.
The policies needed to realize this potential are those which are now being pursued to some degree in all South Asian countries, namely lowering barriers to economic interaction with the rest of the world, including reduction of tariffs and quotas (Panagariya, 1999) , easing restrictions on foreign investment, improving transport infrastructure and streamlining the administrative procedures for exporting and importing (Kathuria & Bhardwaj, 1998; Lall, 1999 Lall, , p. 1784 . Labour market regulations and institutions also require consideration, since the wage level needed to be competitive in world markets for labour-intensive manufactures, though above the earnings of most South Asian peasants, may be below the current earnings of many workers in the organized manufacturing sector.
A vital and widely-agreed long-term objective for South Asia is to raise its general level of education, without which it will not be possible to achieve a much higher level of income, or to move on a large scale into more skill-intensive exports. The analysis in this paper has shown the importance of education as a determinant of export composition, but causation¯ows also in the opposite direction, through the effects of trade on the demand for educated labour. Whether and for how long parents choose to send their children to school, or to exert political pressure for the provision of more and better schools, depends partly on the wages and employment opportunities available to more educated, as compared with less educated, workers, which in turn depends partly on the level and pattern of foreign trade.
Most assessments of the causes of (and remedies for) the low level of literacy in South Asia focus on the supply sideÐ the small number, poor quality and de® cient management of the region' s schoolsÐ taking for granted that the demand for education would be suf® cient to ensure full use of improved schools. This assumption is questionable. The evidence on rates of return to education in South Asia is extremely limited, and gives little support to the conventional view that returns to basic schooling are generally high (Bennell, 1998) . Returns to education in agriculture were increased by the Green Revolution, but only in places whose climate and terrain were suitable for the new technologyÐ and in those places the supply of education responded to the increased demand (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996) . Moreover, the parts of South Asia which through supply-side effort have achieved high levels of literacy, notably Kerala and Sri Lanka, have not attained higher levels of output than the rest of the region. All this is consistent with a broader set of evidence that the economic returns to education are greater in changing and modernizing environments, and all of it suggests that South Asia' s low level of education must be due at least partly to lack of demand.
Reduction of barriers to economic interaction with the rest of the world would increase the demand for literate workers. Although export growth would be concentrated on labour-intensive manufactures, ® rms that produce such goods for world markets employ workers with basic schoolingÐ primary or lower secondaryÐ as is illustrated by the data on textiles in Table 6 (see also Wood, 1994, p. 95) . The expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing, drawing labour mainly from peasant agriculture, where most workers are uneducated, would thus raise the demand for literate labour, encouraging more parents to send their children to school and creating incentives for government at all levels to provide more and better schools. 19 The magnitude of this effect would be limited in the three large South Asian countries by their size, which means that they will never be as open to trade as smaller countries, and hence that only a small proportion of their labour forces will ever be producing for export. But it would shift demand in the right direction, reinforcing efforts to improve the supply of education.
Notes
unprocessed items, but this aspect is of minor importance in the context of South Asia, which has few primary exports. 5. In regressions of the ratios of these three components of service exports to broad primary exports, the coef® cients on n are all of similar size. The coef® cient on p is close to zero for transport and travel services, but is positive (0.13) and almost statistically signi® cant for other services. The coef® cient on h is highest for transport services (0.74), close to zero for other services and in between for travel services (0.48). Transport thus appears to be the most skill-intensive component, and other services the least skill-intensive component. 6. The impression of huge inter-regional differences in population growth rates is misleading:
if the ® gure is replotted with the values on the x-axis in logarithms, proportional growth rates of population look more similar across regions. 7. Our de® nition of East Asia is broad, based on the World Bank' s`East Asia and Paci® c' grouping, but several of the countries concerned are omitted from our analysis, either because they are small (we include only countries with populations above one million) or for lack of data (most notably Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam). 8. This sector was classi® ed as skill-intensive by Wood & Mayer (1998) . However, the skills involved are a manual craft which does not require a high level of education. Moreover, the degree of skill required is lower in India, where most of the stones are small, than in countries such as Israel and the Netherlands. It might thus be more appropriate, particularly in India, to classify this sector as labour-intensive. 9. Bangladesh and Pakistan also have long histories as primary exporters, but their primary exports (® bres) were more suitable for conversion into manufactures, partly as a result of deliberate government policy, than were those of Sri Lanka (mainly tea). 10. A two-tailed t-test of difference of means, assuming unequal variances within the two regions, yields P-values of 0.005 for the actual shares and 0.006 for the predicted shares. 11. The P-value for a two-tailed t-test of difference of means, assuming unequal variances within the two regions, is 0.399. If India' s cut-diamond exports are reclassi® ed as labour-intensive, the average discrepancy rises to 12 points and the P-value of the test on the discrepancies falls to 0.195. 12. If the 1990 actual values are replaced by those of the most recent available year (Table A1) , the regional average discrepancy for South Asia is more or less unaltered at 2 10 percentage points (with virtually no change in the discrepancies for any of the individual countries), while the average for East Asia rises from 2 1 to 1 9 percentage points (with substantial increases particularly in Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand), increasing the gap between the regions from 8 to 19 percentage points. However, part of this widening re¯ects continued growth of labour-intensive electronic assembly operations in East Asia, and part of it is explained by faster expansion of education in East Asia than in South Asia. 13. Higher policy barriers to imports of intermediate goods in South Asia than in East Asia are noted by Radelet et al. (1997) . 14. Many studies have shown that more educated workers have greater potential for learning during employment (e.g. Bartel & Sicherman, 1998) . Case studies of US electronics ® rms in Malaysia document their long-term investment in building up the skills of the local workforce (Hobday, 1995) . 15. Our proxies were: (i) the trade policy measures described in Wood & Mayer (1998) ; (ii) the stock of direct foreign investment (tried also by Greenhill, 1999) ; and (iii) various indicators of risk, including the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Euromoney country risk ranking. More details are available on request. 16. In 1988± 89, the ICRG overall risk rating for Sri Lanka was similar to Bangladesh, and worse than all countries in East Asia other than Myanmar. Pakistan was perceived as slightly less risky than Sri Lanka, but similar to the second and third most risky countries in East Asia, namely the Philippines and Indonesia, which also have large negative discrepancies in Table  5 . 17. The export projections in Pigato et al. (1997) are congruent with our analysis for most South Asian countries, in that they predict expansion to be concentrated on labour-intensive manufactures, but surprisingly, for India they predict substantial growth of more skill-intensive machinery exports, while for better-educated Sri Lanka they do not predict a shift towards more skill-intensive items. Lall (1999) concludes that India' s manufactured exports are likely to remain concentrated on low-tech items, largely because of its small supply of skilled labour, but he argues that changes in policies could and should promote the growth of high-tech exports.
18. This conclusion is tentative, because there are, and will continue to be, exports of labour-intensive services through shipping, tourism, overseas construction and other temporary overseas employment (for example in the Middle East), while many skill-intensive services will remain dif® cult or costly to trade. The overall level of South Asia' s service exports, relative to its merchandise exports, will depend also on the height of barriers to trade in services, relative to the height of barriers to merchandise trade. 19. For a more detailed analysis of the likely effects of increased openness to trade on the demand for education at different levels in India, see Wood & Calandrino (2000) .
